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Abstract Exploring the construct of social-responsibility
orientation across three Asian and two Western societies
(Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and the United
States), we show evidence that top-level executives in these
societies hold fundamentally different beliefs about their
responsibilities toward different stakeholders, with con-
comitant implications for their understanding and enact-
ment of responsible leadership. We further find that these
variations are more closely aligned with institutional fac-
tors than with cultural variables, suggesting a need to
clarify the connection between culture and institutions on
the one hand and culture and social-responsibility orien-
tations on the other.
Keywords Business systems  Culture  Institutions 
Responsible leadership  Varieties of capitalism
‘‘Recognizing our responsibilities as industrialists, we
will devote ourselves to the progress and develop-
ment of society and the well-being of people through
our business activities.’’
Konosuke Matsushita, founder of Matsushita Electric
Industrial Co., Ltd.
‘‘We are investing in environmentally-cleaner tech-
nology because we believe it will increase our
revenue, our value and our profits. … Not because it
is trendy or moral.’’
Jeffrey Immelt, CEO of General Electric
Responsible leadership has emerged as a major theme in
management discourse. As the world recovers from major
economic crisis and, some argue, a crisis ofmanagement ethics
(e.g., Ghoshal 2005; Waldman and Galvin 2008), business
leaders are under increasing scrutiny. Highly publicized
corporate scandals and managerial misconduct have led to a
sense that senior misbehavior is greater than previously
suspected (Brown and Trevin˜o 2006; Kaptein 2008). As a
result, trust in business is at one of the lowest levels on record,
both in the U.S. and in Europe (Edelman 2012).
Not only Western leaders, but top-level executives in
non-Western countries as well have been exposed for dis-
honesty, greed, and unethical business practices. For
instance, managerial malpractice, exacerbated by institu-
tional and cultural factors, have been blamed for corporate
scandals in South Korea (Choi and Aguilera 2009) and
Japan (Tanimura and Okamoto 2013). Similarly, bribery
and corruption scandals in China and India have under-
mined their economic and political stability. The weak
legitimacy of formal institutions and attendant institutional
voids in emerging-market environments have also been
recognized (Khanna and Palepu 1997; Puffer et al. 2010).
The quest for responsible leadership is a response to such
issues and subsequent calls for more ethical managerial
conduct, and a result of changes and new demands in the
global marketplace, such as increased stakeholder activism
and scrutiny (e.g., Doh and Guay 2006; Husted et al. 2012).
With growing socio-political and environmental challenges
around the world, there is pressure from stakeholders—
among them governments, local communities, NGOs, and
consumers—for corporations to engage in self-regulation and
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take more active roles as global citizens (Maak and Pless
2006; Voegtlin et al. 2012). As the growing membership of
companies in theUNGlobalCompact and booming corporate
social responsibility (CSR) initiatives indicate, more and
more business leaders seek to contribute actively to the ‘‘triple
bottom line’’ (Elkington 1997; Savitz and Weber 2006),
which simultaneously considers social, environmental, and
economic sustainability (i.e., ‘‘people, planet, profits’’).
However, despite initiatives such as the UN Global Com-
pact and calls for business leaders to ‘‘contribute to the cre-
ation of economic and societal progress in a globally
responsible and sustainableway’’ (EFMD2005, p. 3), it is still
contested whether corporations and their leaders have social
responsibilities beyond wealth-generation (Aguilera et al.
2007; Devinney 2009; Waldman and Siegel 2008). At one
extreme, classic economic constructs of the firm hold that
business has no responsibility beyond making profit for
shareholders (Friedman 1970); a business leader seeking
‘‘maximum long-term owner value in ethical ways’’ thus acts
responsibly (Sternberg 1994, p. 58). At the other extreme are
ethical frameworks that assume that corporations and their
leaders have an obligation to act according to the needs of a
wide range of constituents, thereby ‘‘acting in the service of
the common good’’ (Crilly et al. 2008, p. 176) or as ‘‘agents of
world benefit’’ (Pless and Maak 2009, p. 60). Clearly, as
Waldman and Galvin (2008, p. 328) have noted, responsible
leadership does not mean the same thing to all.
In this paper, we argue that executives in different societies
hold fundamentally different beliefs about their responsibili-
ties toward different stakeholders, with concomitant impli-
cations for their understanding and enactment of responsible
leadership. We support our argument with evidence of busi-
ness leaders’ views about themeaning of social responsibility,
obtained through in-depth interviews with senior executives
from three Asian (Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea) and two
Western (Germany, United States) economies. The differ-
ences manifest in our data suggest that the very meaning of
‘‘responsibility’’ may be subject to contextually-contingent
differences in interpretation, as illustrated by the two quotes at
the beginning of this article. Our results have significant
implications in understanding responsible leadership, as they
are linked to leaders’ perceptions of the legitimacy of stake-
holders, their propensity to engage in activities that contribute
to social welfare, and, thus, their CSR application. We con-
clude by discussing the implications for research on respon-
sible leadership and CSR practice.
Leaders’ Responsibility Orientations and Underlying
Assumptions About the Purpose of the Firm
Waldman and Galvin (2008) maintain that responsible
leaders embrace different mindsets, which they classify
according to two perspectives: a ‘‘limited economic view’’
emphasizing shareholder primacy, and an ‘‘extended
stakeholder view.’’ Proponents of the former assert that
executive decision-making should focus exclusively on
maximizing shareholder value (e.g., Levitt 1958;
McCloskey 1998; Sundaram and Inkpen 2004). The most
prominent advocate was the late Milton Friedman, who
argued that ‘‘[t]here is one and only one social responsi-
bility of business—to use its resources and engage in
activities designed to increase profits so long as it stays
within the rules of the game’’ (1970, p. 6). As for corporate
responsibility, this economic view suggests that unless
such activities enhance profitability, spending corporate
money for social purposes such as philanthropy is a misuse
of corporate resources, because ‘‘the profits of a publicly-
owned company are not the managers’ to give away’’
(Crook 2005, pp. 17–18). Objectives beyond economic
necessity and minimal legal or moral standards should thus
be ignored, and to the extent that firms make social con-
tributions such as paying taxes and generating employ-
ment, these outcomes are mere byproducts of good
business practices.
By contrast, the extended-stakeholder perspective
acknowledges CSR’s normative drivers, including execu-
tives’ expectations about corporate responsibilities and
their own moral values, which may go beyond economic
interests (Waldman and Siegel 2008). Stakeholder theory
(Agle et al. 2008; Freeman 1994; Phillips et al. 2003) asks
managers to make decisions cognizant of needs and
demands across a broader set of constituencies, including
investors, employees, consumer groups, environmentalists,
and wider society. Thus, the stakeholder perspective
focuses rather on relationships with constituencies, arguing
that their needs must be balanced in the actions of people in
positions of organizational leadership (Margolis and Walsh
2003; Sully de Luque et al. 2008).
While the shareholder-primacy and the stakeholder-
perspective approaches seem to represent polar opposites,
attempts have been made to reconcile them. Freeman et al.
(2004, p. 365) argue that ‘‘[d]ividing the world into
‘shareholder concerns’ and ‘stakeholder concerns’ is
roughly the logical equivalent of contrasting ‘apples’ with
‘fruit,’ [since] shareholders are stakeholders’’ of the com-
pany. They note that in an era when firms rely on com-
mitted value-chain partners to deliver outstanding
performance, the goal of creating value for stakeholders is
decidedly pro-shareholder. In a similar vein, Waldman (in
Waldman and Siegel 2008) has observed that shareholders
in many firms are increasingly demanding that their firms
‘‘do well by doing good,’’ which involves developing new
business models that align social responsibility with profit
maximization. The idea that organizations can profit from
maximizing the benefits of multiple constituents
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concurrently is in line with the concept of shared value
(Porter and Kramer 2011), which holds that companies can
use their core competencies to provide solutions to social
and environmental problems. While many managers
believe there is an inherent trade-off between being prof-
itable and socially responsible, research has supported the
idea of shared value creation, indicating that corporate
financial performance and social performance can go hand-
in-hand (Margolis et al. 2008).
The above three orientations (shareholder primacy,
extended stakeholder, and integrative approaches based on
the concept of shared value) represent the range of beliefs
that may be held regarding businesses’ obligations to
society and CSR in particular. Building on prior research
on responsible leadership (Burton and Goldsby 2009; Pless
et al. 2012; Voegtlin et al. 2012; Waldman and Galvin
2008), we use the term ‘‘responsibility orientation’’ to
denote the different mindsets that corporate executives may
embrace with respect to all aspects of firm activity,
including, but not limited to, corporate responsibility.
These mindsets are rooted in different assumptions about
the purpose of the firm, which stakeholders are legitimate,
and the ways in which firms should respond to stakeholder
groups. In particular, we consider two dimensions of a
leader’s responsibility orientation: how salient or important
various stakeholder groups are in the mind of a leader (e.g.,
is one stakeholder group given primacy over others); and
the leader’s attitudes toward stakeholder groups (i.e., are
some groups evaluated more positively than others). We
posit that the two dimensions are largely independent of
each other. For instance, a senior executive may reject the
objective of shareholder-wealth maximization but still
consider shareholders a key constituent group.
In sum, business leaders embrace different responsibility
orientations or mindsets with respect to the activities of
their firms, which are rooted in different assumptions about
the purpose of the firm, the set of legitimate stakeholders
whose needs must be addressed, and the meaning of social
responsibility in their roles as business leaders. While some
executives see their primary, if not sole, obligations being
to shareholders or owners and to complying with laws and
regulations, others pursue a broader approach, considering
the needs and interests of multiple constituencies.
Theoretical perspectives on responsible leadership are
largely based on Western concepts, such as Habermas’s
theory of discourse ethics and deliberative democracy
(Scherer and Palazzo 2007; Voegtlin et al. 2012), the
Kantian distinction between ‘‘duties of perfect and of
imperfect obligation’’ (i.e., the idea that leaders have the
duty to refrain from harming others and the duty to advance
the aims of others) (Stahl and Sully de Luque 2014), or the
idea rooted in agency theory that good corporate gover-
nance requires executives to act as agents of shareholders
(Filatotchev and Nakajima 2014; Shleifer and Vishny
1997). It is not clear to what extent these concepts and
ideas apply outside North America and Europe, specifically
Asia. In this study, we consequently explore how leaders’
responsibility orientations may vary across different Wes-
tern and Asian societies. A better insight into cross-national
variations in leaders’ responsibility orientations is impor-
tant if we are to better understand factors influencing
senior-executive perceptions of the role of business in
society and the legitimacy of stakeholder claims; the
strategies and approaches available to them for addressing
the needs of different stakeholder groups; and how com-
panies and their leaders gain legitimacy and social accep-
tance in the various institutional environments in which
they operate (Aguilera et al. 2007; Chiu and Sharfman
2011; Doh and Guay 2006).
Asian and Western Orientations to Responsible
Leadership: Institutional and Cultural Influences
Senior executives’ orientations to responsible leadership
are likely to vary across institutional and cultural contexts.
Because corporations and their leaders are embedded in
different national systems, they will embrace different
societal values related to CSR (Schneider et al. 2014;
Waldman et al. 2006) and experience divergent degrees of
internal and external pressures to engage in CSR (Aguilera
and Jackson 2010; Doh and Guay 2006; Matten and Crane
2005). For instance, Martin et al. (2009), comparing busi-
ness ethics between managers from Germany and the US,
concluded that orientations and approaches to responsible
leadership differ. They suggest that the US view has its
basis in utilitarianism and emphasizes the moral responsi-
bility of the individual, while German ‘‘Wirtschaftset-
hik’’—which loosely translates as the ethics of
relationships between economics and society—emphasizes
social partnerships and companies as social entities. Ger-
many’s focus on consensual ethics can be linked to a
social-market philosophy and the stakeholder system of
German corporate governance, which is distinguished by
cooperation and consensus and is clearly different from the
shareholder capitalism common in the US.
The small but growing body of literature addressing how
aspects of the national context may affect leaders’
responsibility orientations and CSR-related decisions is
still very much grounded in European and U.S. contexts.
With notable exceptions (e.g., Chapple and Moon 2005;
Choi and Aguilera 2009), little research has been done in
an Asian context, and few studies have adopted a com-
parative perspective between Asia and the West (e.g., Witt
and Redding 2012). Our study builds on and extends these
works by examining how responsibility orientations,
Responsible Leadership in Asia and the West 625
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conceptualized in terms of the salience of specific stake-
holder groups and leaders’ attitudes toward these groups,
may differ between and within Asia and the West, com-
paring three Asian [Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea
(hereafter: Korea)] and two Western (Germany, United
States) economies. Our specific premise is that aspects of
the institutional context within which companies and their
leaders operate (e.g., corporate governance) are closely
related to the salience of specific stakeholder groups,
whereas cultural values are more closely related to leaders’
attitudes toward these groups, as discussed below.
Institutional contexts have been categorized along many
dimensions (Aguilera and Jackson 2003; Brammer et al.
2012; Hall and Soskice 2001; Matten and Moon 2008;
Whitley 1999; Witt and Redding 2013). Table 1 gives an
overview of those dimensions that seem most relevant to
leaders’ perceptions of the salience of specific stakeholder
groups (e.g., employees, unions, owners/shareholders)
across the economies in our sample.
Hall and Soskice’s (2001) work on Varieties of Capi-
talism suggests that nations can be divided into two types
based on their institutional make-up: liberal market
economies (LMEs) and coordinated market economies
(CMEs). According to their typology, three of the econ-
omies in our study can be classified as CMEs (Germany,
Japan, and, with some qualifications, Korea) and two as
LMEs (Hong Kong and the United States). LMEs feature
relatively free-market arrangements, with supply-and-
demand forces having a large impact on organizational
outcomes and processes. In terms of financial systems,
LMEs such as Britain, Canada, and the US tend to
embrace ‘‘shareholder value,’’ with company performance
measured by market value, returns evaluated on a short-
term basis and the state rarely intervening in the econ-
omy. Employment relations are characterized primarily by
open labor-market relationships, firms having the freedom
to hire and fire employees almost at will and collective
bargaining being uncoordinated and taking place at firm
level (Aguilera and Dencker 2004). In contrast, CMEs
such as Germany, Japan, and Scandinavian countries are
characterized by relatively strong non-market relation-
ships. In these ‘‘stakeholder capitalism’’ national models,
employees, suppliers, customers and financial institutions
are part of the context within which business leaders
make decisions and firm performance is evaluated. Firms
are expected to protect employee rights, collective bar-
gaining tends to be coordinated, and corporate returns
tend to be assessed on a long-term basis (Aguilera and
Dencker 2004; Aguilera and Jackson 2010; Witt and
Redding 2013). In such an environment, senior executives
are more likely to adopt a long-term approach to CSR and
focus on a broader group of constituents in their decisions
and actions.
The above suggests that the CMEs of Germany, Japan,
and Korea on the one hand and LMEs of Hong Kong and
the United States on the other differ on a number of key
dimensions. Leaders in CMEs are likely to adopt a more
comprehensive approach to responsible leadership, taking
into account the claims and interests of a wider range of
stakeholders, both internal and external to the firm. Thus,
the breadth of constituent-group focus and degree of
accountability toward stakeholders other than shareholders
(e.g., employees, unions, suppliers) is likely to be higher in
CMEs, and executives are more likely to pursue an
approach of longer-term value creation, involving aligning
the firm’s interests with those of key stakeholders (Pless
et al. 2012; Waldman and Galvin 2008). In contrast,
leaders in LMEs will be inclined to a ‘‘limited economic’’
view, focusing on shareholder-value maximization and
embracing instrumental ethics (Scherer and Palazzo 2007;
Waldman and Siegel 2008). The needs and claims of
stakeholders other than shareholders are accorded lower
priority and considered only as far as they affect share-
holder interests. Hence our first hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1 The responsibility orientation of senior
executives in CMEs will differ from those in LMEs with
respect to the salience of stakeholder groups. Executives in
LMEs are more likely to give primacy to owners/share-
holders, whereas executives in CMEs are more likely to
consider the needs of a wider range of stakeholders,
including employees, customers, and wider society.
Besides aspects of the institutional context, cultural
factors are likely to play an important role in determining
executives’ responsibility orientations. North American,
European, and Asian cultural systems have generated very
different assumptions about society, business and govern-
ment (Aguilera and Jackson 2010; Matten and Crane 2005;
Redding et al. 2014; Redding and Witt forthcoming).
Martin et al. (2009) demonstrate that differences in cultural
values and beliefs create expectations of acceptable and
unacceptable leader behavior, which places constraints on
the types of leader behavior and characteristics endorsed in
a society. On this basis, we contend that senior executives’
expectations about corporate responsibilities to society and
their attitudes toward specific stakeholder groups will be
shaped by the dominant cultural values in the countries
where they reside.
In this paper we draw on the findings of the GLOBE
project (House et al. 2004; Javidan et al. 2006), a large-
scale study of cross-cultural leadership involving 62 soci-
eties around the world, to explore implications for
responsible leadership. GLOBE developed nine dimensions
for comparing the different societal cultures of the world,
of which three have consistently been found to be related to
responsible leadership and CSR (Husted and Allen 2008;
626 M. A. Witt, G. K. Stahl
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Waldman et al. 2006; Williams and Aguilera 2008):
institutional collectivism, power distance, and humane
orientation. For instance, in a study of 561 firms based in
15 countries on five continents, Waldman et al. (2006)
examined the relationship between CSR orientations of top
management and two country-level cultural dimensions,
institutional collectivism and power distance. They found
that managers in countries with high institutional collec-
tivism and low power distance were more likely to mani-
fest behaviors associated with three responsibility
orientations: concern for shareholders, concern for stake-
holders, and concern for community/state welfare. Impor-
tantly, their findings suggest that cultures valuing
institutional collectivism promote thinking about how
managerial actions pertain to the concerns of a wider range
of stakeholders and wider society, whereas cultures with
strong power distance values may reduce managers’ con-
cern for such stakeholders as employees, environmental-
ists, and customers.
Other studies have found that humane orientation
explains a predisposition to engage in responsible leader
behavior. Humane orientation is the degree to which a
society encourages and rewards individuals for being fair,
altruistic, generous, caring, and kind to others (House et al.
2004; Javidan et al. 2006). Countries with stronger humane
orientation consider the interests of others, affirm belong-
ing and affiliation, and embrace norms and responsibilities
for protecting the well-being of others. Martin and his
colleagues (e.g., Martin et al. 2007; Bame-Aldred et al.
2013) found that managers in countries low in humane
orientation are more likely to show behaviors considered
socially harmful. Humane orientation is thus likely to be
positively associated with leaders’ propensity to consider
the needs of a broad set of stakeholders and society as a
whole. The foregoing discussion suggests the following
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 The responsibility orientation of senior
executives, particularly their attitudes toward different
stakeholder groups, will vary across different cultural
contexts. Executives from cultures characterized by strong
institutional collectivism and humane orientation and weak
power distance are more likely to show concern for a wider
range of stakeholders and society at large than executives
from cultures characterized by weak institutional collec-
tivism and humane orientation and strong power distance.
A critical distinction in the GLOBE project is the one
between cultural values and practices. On each dimension a
society is positioned in terms of both its practices (‘‘Culture
As Is’’-scores) and its values (‘‘Culture As Should Be’’-
scores). Cultural practices data tell us something about the
current perceptions, attitudes and practices of each culture,
cultural values tap the respondents’ feelings about their
cultural aspirations and the direction the respondents want
their culture to develop in the future (Javidan et al. 2006).
Most studies that draw on the findings of the GLOBE
project to investigate the culture-CSR link use the cultural
values scores; however, since we are interested in how
cultural orientations might influence senior leaders’ per-
ceptions of the role of business in society, the legitimacy of
stakeholders, and the approaches available to them for
addressing the needs of different stakeholder groups—and,
thus ‘‘Culture As Is’’—we use the GLOBE cultural prac-
tices scores to test our assumptions.
Based on the GLOBE study, all three Asian economies
in this study fall into the Confucian Asia (East Asian)
cluster, characterized by high institutional collectivism,
moderate to high power distance, and moderate humane
orientation (Javidan et al. 2006). The cultural profiles of
Hong Kong, Japan, and Korea are thus distinct from both
the Anglo and Germanic cultural cluster. However, as
shown in Table 1, subtle differences exist among the
countries of the Confucian Asia cluster. For instance,
Korea has significantly higher scores on the power-distance
scale than both Hong Kong and Japan; Hong Kong has the
lowest scores on institutional collectivism among the three;
and Japan scores significantly higher on humane orienta-
tion than Hong Kong and Korea, while also scoring high on
institutional collectivism. This pattern supports the pre-
diction that among business leaders from these Asian
economies, Japanese executives will show greater concern
for stakeholders other than shareholders, and society at
large and its welfare, than South Korean or Hong Kong
leaders. Germany and the United States differ in many
respects from these Asian economies and also from each
other in terms of cultural orientations. However, it is
noteworthy that the United States and Hong Kong, both
LMEs, have very similar scores on the GLOBE institu-
tional collectivism, power distance, and humane orienta-
tion scales, which leads us to predict that senior executives
in these two economies will exhibit similar responsibility
orientations.
Based on the above, several broad generalizations can
be made regarding expectations of leaders’ responsibility
orientations in the five economies studied here. In terms of
institutional factors, we have shown that the CMEs of
Germany, Japan, and Korea differ from the LMEs of Hong
Kong and the United States on a number of key dimen-
sions, including ownership, employee relations, skills for-
mation, corporate governance, and the role of the state.
These differences likely have important implications for
leaders’ responsibility orientations, particularly the per-
ceived salience of stakeholder groups. For example, it
might be predicted that German and Japanese business
leaders will pursue an approach to responsible leadership
that is longer-term and takes a wider range of stakeholders
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into account, whereas business leaders in the United States
and Hong Kong will tend toward a narrower constituent
focus, prioritizing shareholder interests. In addition to
institutional factors, our analysis suggests that cultural
values may matter as well. For instance, the specific cul-
tural profiles of Germany (e.g., low collectivism and
humane orientation) and Japan (e.g., high collectivism and
humane orientation) suggest that despite some similarities
of institutional context, Japanese business leaders will,
more than German leaders, tend to emphasize the interests
of stakeholders with whom the firm is closely aligned (such
as suppliers and distributors), as well as society at large.
Below, we explore these issues empirically, comparing
and contrasting the responsibility orientations of business
leaders from the selected economies.
Data and Methods
Of our five economies, Germany and the United States were
included as reference points of Western ways of doing
business (also known as ‘‘business systems’’), namely, as
exemplars of its Anglo-Saxon and continental European
varieties (Hall and Soskice 2001; Whitley 1999). The Asian
economies feature the three major Asian types of business
system (private Chinese, Japanese, and Korean) previously
identified (Whitley 1992, 1999). Private Chinese business is
distinct among these in that it is not territorially-bound, but
extends across much of East Asia. The choice of Hong Kong
as representative of this system was conditioned by prior
findings that, first, there exists a common mindset among
ethnic Chinese businesses in Asia (Redding 1990), and
second, that the mainland Chinese mindset has at least par-
tially converged with it, largely as a result of Hong Kong
business activities in the People’s Republic (Ralston et al.
2006; Redding and Witt 2007). Jointly, our sample encom-
passes five distinct institutional contexts—three Asian and
two Western—and three cultural realms: Confucian Asian,
Germanic European, and Anglo (see Table 1). The combi-
nation of institutional variation and cultural commonalities
should be helpful for parceling out sources of variation in
responsibility orientations.
Data collection involved interviews with 73 top-level
executives, serving or recently retired, of major local firms.
In line with variations in corporate governance structures,
the precise definition of ‘‘top-level’’ varied by local con-
text. For Hong Kong, Korea, and the US, we focused on
top management teams; in Germany, on members of
management and supervisory boards; and in Japan, man-
agement boards. These all have in common responsibility
at the highest level for creating and executing company
strategy. Most of the interviewees were chairmen, CEOs,
or presidents, and thus involved in general management.
‘‘Major firms’’ in our definition were those belonging to
the economically dominant organizational type in the
respective economy: in Germany, firms large enough to be
listed, or eligible for listing, among its largest 100 firms; in
Hong Kong, major listed firms; in Japan, members of the
six major business groups (keiretsu); in Korea, conglom-
erates of various sizes, with a focus on chaebol; and in the
United States, Fortune 500 firms. Seventeen executives
were interviewed in Germany, 10 in Hong Kong, 17 in
Japan, 15 in Korea, and 14 in the United States.
We drew on existing connections and third-party intro-
ductions to reach our interviewees. We reduced the risk of
sampling bias inherent in this type of research by obtaining
introductions from mutually independent contacts. Our
analysis did not reveal significant within-country effects
driven by known differences at the individual level, such as
industries or whether the interviewee had a significant
ownership stake in the company.
Given the exploratory nature of this research, we used
semi-structured, in-depth interviews (Redding 1990). We
conducted all interviews face-to-face, with the exception of
four phone interviews with US executives. The average
interview took 45 min in the United States and about 1 h
elsewhere. Interviews in Germany were in German, those
in Japan in Japanese except for one case, in which the
interviewee chose English. All other interviews were in
English. We recorded all interviews on the understanding
that the data provided were not for attribution.
We used exploratory content analysis to identify the
core elements of leaders’ responsibility orientations. We
transcribed all interviews verbatim in the respective lan-
guage, then assigned to all statements relevant to the
research question a category (e.g., employees, sharehold-
ers) and a value between -3 and ?3 denoting attitude, as
described in Table 2. Given the study’s exploratory nature,
we let the categories emerge from the interview data (Al-
theide 1987; Krippendorff 2004; Redding 1990), i.e., we
did not impose a pre-defined list of categories, but added
new ones as necessary.
We used a standard refereeing process to verify coding
reliability and validity. Research assistants with no prior
involvement in the project but the requisite language skills
received a 1-h introduction to the process and a list of
coding categories. They then coded randomly-selected,
contiguous segments amounting to five percent of the total
length of the transcripts of each geography. Statistics for
intercoder agreement are summarized in Table 3. All val-
ues of Cohen’s kappa are above the most demanding levels
of 0.75–0.80 postulated in the methodological literature
(Banerjee et al. 1999; Popping 1988).
In this paper, we focus on how executives linked their
firm’s rationale to various stakeholder categories, such as
employees or shareholders. Since executives sometimes
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referred to ‘‘stakeholders’’ without specifying who they had
in mind, we also include this category in our report. As
summary statistics, for each stakeholder category in each
economy, we calculated overall salience and overall atti-
tude. Overall salience is the percentage of interviewees
referring to the given stakeholder category. Overall attitude
is the mean of the attitude values (-3 to ?3) assigned to all
statements about the given stakeholder category in the
respective economy.
Results
Table 4 presents an overview of our findings. For each
economy, we report all stakeholder categories discussed by
executives in descending order of salience. Average attitude
values are coded using shades of gray, as marked in the table.
A caveat in the interpretation of Table 4 is that the lower
the salience, the more vulnerable attitude values become to
outlier opinions. This shows most clearly in the low value
for creditors in the United States, based on a single nega-
tive statement by a single executive. The same concern
applies to all categories with single-digit salience values, as
well as the ‘‘stakeholders’’ category for Hong Kong. These
findings are reported for the sake of completeness.
While considerable heterogeneity is suggested in terms of
categories and their saliences and attitude scores, a number
of patterns are visible. First, the three most salient stake-
holders across all five economies are identical (though with
variation in the specific order): employees, shareholders, and
society form a trinity of major stakeholder categories
regardless of cultural and institutional context. Second, in
four of the five—Korea being the exception—customers
occupy a relatively salient position in the minds of execu-
tives. However, given the gap in salience compared with the
trinity categories, they seem to be secondary.
Third, the five economies seem to fall into two general
groups: a shareholder-primacy group including Hong Kong
and the US, which ranks owners/shareholders highest in
terms of salience and holds a relatively positive attitude
toward this constituent group; and an employee and soci-
ety-focused group including Germany and Japan, whose
attitude values suggest relatively greater affinity to
employees and society than to shareholders (although
owners/shareholders are seen as important constituent
group). Intriguingly, these two economies are also the only
ones to mention suppliers as stakeholders, which is con-
sistent with findings on long-term reciprocal supply chain
relations in these economies (cf. Witt 2006). Korea lies in
between, though its relative emphasis on employees and
further analysis of the interviews (see below) suggest that it
may lean somewhat toward an ‘‘employee and society’’
focus. This dichotomous finding is noteworthy in that it
mirrors the general categorization of these economies in
the varieties of capitalism and business systems literatures
(cf. Witt and Redding 2013), which supports Hypothesis 1.
At the same time, it is inconsistent with Hypothesis 2,
which suggested clustering along cultural lines and thus a
clear divide between Asian and Western economies,
especially in terms of senior executives’ attitudes toward
stakeholder groups.
We now offer a more detailed exposition of the findings
for each economy. Given the caveat about outlier opinions
already mentioned, we will focus on categories on which at
least half the executives (or, for odd-numbered samples,
(N-1)/2 executives) touched.
Germany
Shareholders represented the most salient stakeholder.
However, the attitude score was much lower than for any
Table 2 Coding scheme for attitude
Value Meaning Example
?3 Affirmation through action We follow the Jack Welch recipe book for maximizing shareholder value
?2 Affirmation Shareholder value is a key component of why firms exist
?1 Tentative affirmation I think shareholder value is an important factor
0 Neither affirmation nor rejection Shareholder value is neither here nor there as far as I am concerned
-1 Tentative rejection Shareholder value does not seem like something we should consider
-2 Rejection Shareholder value is not something firms should do
-3 Rejection through action We used to emphasize shareholder value, I put an end to this
Table 3 Intercoder reliabilities
Geography Cohen’s kappa (threshold 0.75–0.80)
Germany 0.91
Hong Kong 0.87
Japan 0.85
Korea 0.85
USA 0.88
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other category. In particular, virtually no executive favored
pursuing shareholder value. The majority never mentioned
shareholder value, and when the topic was discussed, in-
terviewees typically expressed a diffident or negative view:
‘‘I consider an exclusive focus on shareholder value,
however one defines it, highly questionable.‘‘
At the same time, most executives recognized share-
holders’ right to decent earnings, though in some cases
reluctantly:
‘‘I do not necessarily need shareholders. After all, there
are other forms of obtaining finance. … Yet we are a
corporation, and so the shareholders are decisive for us.’’
In the minds of German executives, shareholders are thus a
stakeholder groupwhose interests are not primary, but coexist
and at times compete with those of other stakeholders.
Employees were the second most salient stakeholder
category. Key concern was the provision of employment
for the benefit of both, employees and society:
‘‘To provide work and bread for a large number of
people is an extraordinarily important task. If that
were not done, an entire people would be, so to speak,
bread-less.’’
Some executives further suggested a role for their firms in
letting employees develop themselves and find personal
fulfillment. The third most salient stakeholder was society.
The dominantmodeof serving society described in interviews
was through the provision of required goods and services,
with some intersection with catering to customers’ needs.
Striking in the context of the 2008financial crisis, for instance,
is the following statement by a banker:
‘‘A bank is anyway, next to the fact that it makes a
profit, an affair that is relevant to society to the
highest degree, as it offers loans, and loans are the
lifeblood of an economy.’’
Other executives, especially from other industries, tended
to point to the value of their products in facilitating social
life as we know it and driving social progress through
innovation:
‘‘If you are a manufacturing firm, you should…
equally bring innovation to society. And that society
is provided for with products is self-evident.’’
Firm activities and survival are thus not at the discretion of
managers and owners, but a social obligation.
All these various claims of stakeholders presented
themselves in a complex web of interdependencies:
‘‘People are not the abstract capital of the dividend.
They are supposed to serve their firm so that the
people in the firm flourish, and in order for them to
flourish, capital has to increase to the maximum
extent and has to be served properly, just as I cannot
kill my suppliers.’’
The implication is that the firm’s well-being was seen as
contingent on its ability to confer benefit to all stakeholder
groups.
Among executives citing several stakeholders, there was
no consensus about an order of importance.Most did not state
a rank order, and some even argued that even the attempt at
ranking would lead to an ‘‘intellectual dead-end.’’ To the
extent rank orders were offered, they varied by interviewee,
and sometimes even changed in the course of an interview.
This may indicate a complex balancing act within a rationale
that founds action in the maintenance of stability.
Hong Kong
The vast majority of Hong Kong executives regarded
serving shareholders as a firm’s primary objective. A key
objective in this context was to provide wealth to the
owning family:
Table 4 Stakeholders by economy in descending order of salience
Germany Hong Kong Japan Korea US
Shareholders 88% Shareholders 60% Society 88% Employees 80% Shareholders 93%
Employees 82% Society 50% Employees 82% Shareholders 73% Society 71%
Society 71% Employees 50% Shareholders 76% Society 67% Employees 71%
Customers 41% Customers 30% Customers 59% Stakeholders 7% 57%
Stakeholders 29% Stakeholders 47% Customers 7% Stakeholders 21%
Suppliers 24% Suppliers 18% Creditors 7%
Creditors 6%
Distributors 6%
≥2.00
1.75-
1.99
1.25-
1.74
1.00-
1.24 <1.00
Customers
Stakeholders 10%
Shades of gray denote attitude (cf. bottom of table). Where two or more categories share the same salience value, they are shown in descending
order of attitude. Where two or more categories have both identical salience and attitude values, they are shown in alphabetical order
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‘‘[For] most business enterprises in the society, cre-
ating wealth for themselves…[for] their family
members would probably be the initial driving
force.’’
Sixty percent directly expressed the view that Hong Kong
firms exist to enrich their primary shareholders. The
attitude score was highly positive in general, a fact
obscured in the average attitude rating because of one
interviewee’s critical views.
A further 30 % made the same point more diplomati-
cally by stressing the importance of shareholders and
shareholder value. While formally consistent with the
shareholder emphasis in much of recent international
management discourse, there was a clear sense that not all
shareholders are equal:
‘‘Hong Kong families, many of them, they don’t treat
minority shareholders that well… They do business
with their own family companies.’’
This practice of self-dealing among firms with the same
owners has been implicated in ‘‘tunneling’’ profits away from
minority shareholders toward firms in which ultimate owners
hold the highest cash-flow rights (Cheung et al. 2006).
Wealth enables contributing to society through charity,
with society being mentioned very positively by half the
executives. In general, charity was portrayed as something
to indulge in after becoming wealthy:
‘‘After I make a lot of money [through the firm], then
I think social work is one of the ways I spend my
money.’’
The picture thus drawn by our Hong Kong interviewees is
consistent with a fairly narrow focus on the self-interest of
controlling shareholders. Recognition of the firm’s role in
society was not entirely absent, though weakly developed
and seemingly subject to getting rich first:
‘‘Once [owners] reach a certain stage, probably they
will be begin to think beyond creating wealth or to
the stage that wealth is sufficient enough that they
don’t have to worry about, then they will cross to the
next level of… contributing back to society.’’
Also weak was a sense of responsibility toward employees.
There was no strong integration in the worldview of
executives other than a recognition of employees as a
necessary but ultimately dispensable production factor. A
striking example of this was the assertion that the reason
Hong Kong firms preferred labor-intensive to capital-
intensive activities was that
‘‘you can lay off half your staff, but you cannot lay
off half the equipment and not bear the burden of the
initial capital cost.’’
Japan
Japanese executives regarded serving society as a primary
objective of their firm. Exemplary was the following view:
‘‘For a manager, the most important thing is not to
improve business results during one’s time. Rather, I
think what is extremely important is when one passes
[things] on to the next manager, to what extent the
firm is one whose shape is accepted by society, and
one can ensure the permanence of the firm.’’
Serving the firm’s key stakeholders emerged as the main
avenue of becoming ‘‘accepted by society.’’ Slightly less
than half of the interviewees made this approach explicit,
often by contrasting their approach with the perceived
single-minded US focus on shareholders:
‘‘Not like that American-style ‘shareholder-only,’ not
that way of doing things, but managers have after all
a responsibility toward all stakeholders.’’
Yet not all stakeholders are equal. Most important for
Japanese executives were their employees:
‘‘I think [the most important stakeholder] is the
employees. Pay the shareholder a dividend within
tolerable bounds.’’
Implicit in this and similar statements is a ranking that
places employees first and sees shareholders as a con-
straint. As such, these statements effectively represent a
reverse of the US shareholder-value approach, which
places the shareholder first and pays non-executive
employees an income ‘‘within tolerable bounds.’’
The most commonly discussed avenue of taking care of
employees was through sharing economic surplus created
in the firm, which in turn was taken to improve living
standards and stability in private life. Several executives
also considered it important for firms to contribute to the
personal development and self-fulfillment of employees.
Shareholders as a stakeholder group were similarly
salient in the minds of executives, but with considerably
lower attitude value. In particular, there was universal
rejection of US-style thinking:
‘‘This shareholder value discussed these days is all
short-term. Not like that, we look at the long term.’’
The notion that shareholders as owners of the company
should have a right to determine its fate was explicitly
rejected. Even when shareholders received recognition as a
legitimate stakeholder, they were mostly seen as a
constraint, as already noted: ‘‘after all, this is the era of
the shareholders.’’
The fourth salient stakeholder was customers. In the
words of one interviewee, companies strive to ‘‘do work
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that is useful for the customer by making perfect products.’’
Serving the customer was seen not only as an objective
in its own right, but also another avenue for serving
society.
Korea
Korean executives portrayed an environment requiring
careful balancing of stakeholders locked in fundamental
conflict.
Employees emerged as the most salient stakeholders.
The majority of interviewees saw employees as an end in
themselves:
‘‘[The rationale] is to make employees happy.’’
A minority took a more instrumental view, linking
employees’ hard work to more profit and thus an ability
to pay higher dividends and more taxes.
About three-quarters of executives identified share-
holders as important stakeholders, though with the lowest
attitude value of all elements in Korea. Some executives
had drawn the conclusion from the 1997/98 financial crisis
that they should focus on shareholder value:
‘‘But after IMF crisis people realized the purpose of
the company is to maximize all the shareholders’
value, which is quite different.’’
A majority, however, rejected the prioritization of share-
holders. Shareholders were generally seen as only one, and
not necessarily the primary, stakeholder, even if companies
officially espoused shareholder value:
‘‘Internally, I think the employees are more impor-
tant. Then the shareholders… But officially, the
shareholders, of course.’’
A number of factors underlie this perceived need for
balance. One expressed was a lack of confidence that
shareholder value as a strategy was sustainable. A second
driver, not explicitly discussed initially but emerging later
in the interviews, was the conflictual nature of employment
relations in Korea, with high levels of often violent strikes.
Accordingly, a number of interviewees pointed to the need
for the firm to run in the ‘‘spirit of a family’’ and with
‘‘more feel to it so that employees feel like they are in a
very friendly organization.’’
The third major stakeholder mentioned was society at
large. Concern with society ranged from the generic need
to be a ‘‘good citizen for society’’ to specific notions of
needing to engage in corporate charity, a topic in two-
thirds of the interviews:
‘‘We have to return the profit, some of the profit back
to society.’’
Coexisting with charity as a means of serving society was a
desire to contribute to economic development, identified as
still important by about half the executives. Executives
espousing this view pointed to a need to support the nation
by aiding further development:
‘‘Still we have low levels of income…, so we are still
eager to focus on the economic growth, development.’’
While both approaches to serving society, charity and
development, coexisted, the relatively higher age of
executives espousing the latter suggests that this may
disappear over time, leaving charity as the main avenue.
Unspoken was the driver underlying both approaches,
namely, a need to placate a Korean public increasingly
hostile to the power and wealth of large conglomerates (cf.
Witt 2014).
United States
A large majority of our interviewees identified the pursuit
of shareholder value as a firm’s rationale. US interviewees
frequently began with this point and tended to use similar
language to the following:
‘‘[The reason,] it’s shareholder return.’’
The one executive not to mention shareholder value did so
in the context of a discussion of the US mindset in general,
which took this interview to a higher conceptual level than
others.
Other stakeholders cited were customers, employees,
and society, the last often in terms of local communities.
These were, however, clearly subordinate to shareholder
interests:
‘‘The primary objective being a shareholder objec-
tive, leads some secondary objectives which are all
about, you know, satisfying products, happy cus-
tomers, a community that uses them as a reasonable
participant in the community.’’
As a result, providing benefits to these other stakeholder
groups tended to be seen primarily as means toward the
larger end of shareholder value. As regards employees, for
instance, ensuring that ‘‘employees are appropriately paid’’
was important to obtaining their cooperation. One execu-
tive elaborated:
‘‘You can’t just do anything in order to increase
shareholder value… Because ultimately if you are
hurting your employees, … you are not going to
create a lot of shareholder value.’’
Likewise, serving society was not a goal in itself, but
society was a stakeholder ‘‘to be very conscious of—as
long as there is some benefit to the bottom line:’’
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‘‘You want to be a good citizen in the community, but
not because good citizenship is good, but because if
you are not a good citizen, you will be punished and
you will not be able to make a profit for your
shareholders.’’
Main avenues of service to society identified were the
creation of employment and the provision of ‘‘an essential
product or service that is either needed or desired by the
population.’’ Proponents of the latter, productionist, view
tended to be older, suggesting that their views may be
consistent with how executives viewed the world before
the arrival of shareholder-value dominance (cf. Fligstein
2001).
Similarly, US executives tended to view customers as
secondary to shareholders:
‘‘I don’t believe you want to satisfy your customers in
and of itself, you want to satisfy your customers
because that is what you have to do to make a profit
from your customers.’’
Accordingly, profits were seen as more important than
customers, lest ‘‘new owners will come in and they will
say, we will give less to the customers, because you are
giving stuff to the customers that isn’t getting paid for.’’
Discussion
Based on interviews with 73 senior executives from three
Asian (Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea) and two Western
(Germany, United States) economies, we have shown that
executives’ responsibility orientations—the way they make
sense of what they are doing and how they see their
responsibility to the firm’s stakeholders and wider soci-
ety—vary considerably both between and within Asian
societies and the West. The overall picture is broadly
consistent with the varieties of capitalism literature
dichotomously distinguishing LMEs (Hong Kong, US) and
CMEs (Germany, Japan, and arguably Korea). Of course,
there is variance within these broad categories, and further
forms beyond these two are possible and even likely if
more economies are sampled.
These differences have important implications for
managerial decision-making and the enactment of respon-
sible leadership, as they affect leaders’ understanding of
the meaning of social responsibility in their roles as busi-
ness leaders, perceptions of the legitimacy of stakeholder
groups, and their propensity to engage in activities that
contribute to the welfare of their various stakeholders,
including shareholders, employees, customers, and wider
society (Burton and Goldsby 2009; Pless et al. 2012;
Waldman and Galvin 2008).
In light of the fundamental differences in views and
opinions expressed by interviewees, it is tempting to con-
clude that the cross-societal variations in leaders’ respon-
sibility orientations found in this study are not so much
about actors playing the same game by different rules, but
about business leaders in different societies playing
entirely different games or having fundamentally different
assumptions about the deeper purposes behind the game.
Although a large majority of executives in each economy
agreed on the importance of taking stakeholders into
account when making decisions, those in different econo-
mies had very different ideas about how and why firms
contribute to society and the meaning of responsibility in
their roles of business leaders. Also, our interview findings
suggest significant cross-societal variation along several
key dimensions of responsible leadership, including the
extent to which executives embrace a ‘‘limited economic’’
versus ‘‘extended stakeholder’’ view (Sully de Luque et al.
2008; Waldman and Galvin 2008); have a narrow versus
broad constituent-group focus (Pless et al. 2012); and take
a more instrumental versus values-driven approach to
corporate responsibility (Palazzo and Scherer 2006; Vo-
egtlin et al. 2012).
In addition to the key dimensions of responsible lead-
ership advanced in the literature, we found it useful to
consider the attitudes that senior executives expressed
toward different stakeholders. While all average attitude
values reported are positive in value, we found a wide
range in the degree of positiveness. For example, we found
that executives in all five societies regarded shareholders as
a key stakeholder, with most interviewees referring to
them; however, attitudes varied significantly. At one
extreme, we saw a tendency among Japanese and German
executives to reject shareholder primacy, and indeed the
right of shareholders to become involved in the running of
the company. As a result of these negative qualifications of
executives’ general agreement that shareholders mattered,
average attitudes toward shareholders in these economies
were at 1 or below. At the other extreme, the vast majority
of US executives expressed a positive view of shareholder
primacy and identified the pursuit of shareholder value as
the firm’s principal rationale. Similarly, executives in all
five economies identified employees as an important
stakeholder group, but with considerable variation in atti-
tude. Hong Kong, followed by US, executives were least
positive, even viewing employees as an expense or prob-
lem. By contrast, executives in Japan, Korea and Germany
identified employees’ well-being as a firm’s key objective
and tended toward positive attitudes regarding this stake-
holder group.
These findings illustrate significant cross-societal vari-
ations in leaders’ responsibility orientations—i.e., their
attitudes toward legitimate stakeholders and in what ways
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firms should respond to each stakeholder group. However,
these differences do not align neatly with existing cultural
clusters like those identified in the GLOBE project (House
et al. 2004; Javidan et al. 2006). For example, the above
discussion suggests that in terms of stakeholder orientation
and corporate responsibility, Germany and Japan seem to
have more in common than Japan and other East Asian
societies. This is consistent with a recent study (Witt and
Redding 2013) that found that Germany and Japan, despite
significant differences in national culture, are closer in
terms of institutional practices than countries sharing a
common cultural heritage, such as Germany and the United
States, or Japan and Korea.
The presence and absence of alignment with institutional
and cultural factors, respectively, poses important questions
about the relationship between culture and institutions. Thus
far we have treated institutional characteristics and cultural
factors as if separate antecedents of leaders’ responsibility
orientations. However, aspects of the institutional environ-
ment and cultural traits are probably interdependent and
mutually reinforcing (Redding and Witt 2007; Redding
2008). As Aguilera and Jackson (2010, p. 504) put it,
‘‘[c]ulture and institutions are historically intertwined in
ways where it makes little sense to draw causal arrows
between artificially divided cultural and institutional vari-
ables.’’ This implies that no single cultural dimension or
institutional characteristic (or limited set of cultural and
institutional factors) is likely to predict or explain differences
in leaders’ responsibility orientations across countries.
In interpreting our findings, it is further important to
consider that the cultural and institutional contexts of firms
(and managerial decision-making) are not static, but sub-
ject to dynamic and emergent processes. Furthermore, the
relationship between national context and leaders’
approaches to CSR is mutual and reciprocal, with leaders
able to foster structural change, for instance, by facilitating
collective action. As Witt and Redding (2012, p. 110) have
pointed out, ‘‘senior executives are in powerful positions to
subvert and shape the institutional structures in which firms
are embedded, including those related to CSR.’’ The way
Korean executives responded to social pressure toward
corporate responsibility in the wake of the 1997/1998
Asian financial crisis is instructive in this regard. Choi and
Aguilera (2009) showed how the crisis, which impacted
Korean conglomerates severely, introduced CSR concepts
to Korean society. It prompted local actors to rethink the
role and responsibilities of corporations in society, leading
to improved corporate governance and more responsible
leader behavior. Korean managers were thus ‘forced’ to
develop a stronger responsibility orientation and to con-
sider the claims of a larger group of stakeholders for
instrumental reasons, including restoring their damaged
reliability and reputation.
Limitations and Implications for Research
This study provides important insights into the interna-
tional variety of responsibility orientations among top
executives of major firms. Like all studies, it has limita-
tions, while opening up several avenues for future
investigation.
First, the data presented here are based on five relatively
small, non-random samples, which implies a risk of sam-
pling bias. We mitigated this risk partially through inde-
pendent introductions to interviewees. Still, to better
understand the limits of generalizability in the findings, this
study should be replicated using a larger sample of indi-
viduals and organizations, and comparing leaders’
responsibility orientations across a diverse range of cultural
and institutional contexts.
Second, since our level of analysis was the entire
economy, this study cannot provide much insight in vari-
ations in responsibility orientations as they may exist at the
level of the industry or the firm. Factors such as levels of
competition, turbulence, or capital and labor intensities
may affect responsibility orientations. Studying these
variations would require a much larger sample than our,
especially if the goal is to make comparisons across
countries at the industry level. This study was not designed
to do this, and given the extreme difficulty of getting access
to interviewees of the caliber studied in our paper, we are
not sure it is feasible.
Third, while the present results are suggestive in terms
of a possible link between the type of business system
present in a given economy and responsibility orientation,
they are not conclusive. Future research should explore
social-responsibility orientations in economies with similar
business systems, such as that of the Regional Ethnic
Chinese of Southeast Asia or that of Germany and the
northern Continental European economies. High levels of
similarity within these areas would underline the impor-
tance of institutional influences.
Fourth, further research may shed light on the linkage
between cultural practices and values, such as those iden-
tified by the GLOBE project (House et al. 2004; Javidan
et al. 2006), and leaders’ orientations and approaches to
CSR. Much evidence indicates that culture matters in
responsible leadership and ethical behavior, but how,
when, and why are less clear. For instance, past research
has found significant cultural differences in managers’
willingness to accept bribery as the price of business, and
willingness to engage in other forms of unethical conduct
(e.g., Jing and Graham 2008; Martin et al. 2007). However,
as culture is often correlated with other socio-economic
influences such as GDP and institutions, it is difficult to
determine which country-level factors are driving corrupt
behavior. The evidence thus fails to show whether some
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cultures are more or less ethical or responsible than others
(O’Fallon and Butterfield 2005).
Finally, future research should focus on the linkage
between espoused values about responsibility orientations
held by interviewees and their decisions and actions.
Ghoshal (2005) implied that the extent to which executives
embrace a ‘‘limited economic’’ versus an ‘‘extended
stakeholder’’ view will affect the enactment of responsible
leadership and the long-term viability of their companies,
but little research has been conducted on how managers’
responsibility orientation relates to actual behavior. Burton
and Goldsby (2009) found that business owners translated
CSR-related attitudes and orientations into behavior fairly
directly. Those who embraced a ‘‘limited economic’’ view
tended to concentrate on shareholders’ interests and profit-
related goals; those placing more emphasis on non-eco-
nomic domains concentrated on the interests of a larger
group of stakeholders and community-related goals. This
suggests that leaders’ responsibility orientation might be a
proxy for the behavior side of responsible leadership and
corporate social performance. More research is needed to
examine how leaders’ values and orientations affect their
propensity to engage in activities that contribute to the
welfare of their various stakeholders, and how these pro-
cesses vary across different cultural and institutional
contexts.
Implications for Practice
The growing literature on international CSR has identified
three prototypical approaches to corporate responsibility
and sustainability in global corporations that affect a firm’s
CSR performance. Based on the tensions and possible
trade-offs between globally integrated and locally adapted
strategies, companies may adopt a ‘‘global CSR approach’’,
a ‘‘local CSR approach,’’ or a ‘‘transnational CSR
approach’’ (Arthaud-Day 2005; Husted and Allen 2006;
Stahl et al. 2013). The viability of the globally standardized
approach rests on the assumption of a universal standard of
responsible behavior that transcends the norms and values
of particular societies. Our findings challenge the existence
of such universal standards. Thus, a global CSR approach
may lead to cultural arrogance and ethical imperialism,
directing executives to impose their values on others and
act everywhere in the way things are done at headquarters
(Donaldson 1996). However, locally-oriented CSR is also
problematic, as it makes it difficult to apply any universally
accepted code of conduct or even to determine what is
responsible or acceptable (Stahl et al. 2013). In light of the
significant cross-national differences found in this study,
and the simultaneous need for companies to ensure con-
sistency with respect to their CSR activities across the
organization, it seems that the transnational approach is
best able to help companies coordinate their world-wide
CSR activities and promote responsible leadership in the
organization.
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